1. Hunt’s Watergate Involvement (two excerpts) • First discussed: June 19, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On June 19, 1972, two days after the Watergate arrests, Felt told Woodward that White House consultant Howard Hunt was “definitely involved” in Watergate.” (All the President’s Men[ATPM], pages 25 and 72)
Who knew? Liddy told Dean of Hunt’s Watergate involvement at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972, and Felt told Woodward of it before 3 PM that same afternoon. Except for Felt, the FBI did not yet know of Hunt’s involvement. Few besides Dean knew of Hunt’s Watergate involvement before Felt told Woodward of it. Most who did know of Hunt’s Watergate involvement were in jail and had not made any phone calls.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean led others to believe that Hunt’s Watergate involvement was “widely known,” though this was not true. Dean modified this excerpt.
2. White House “High Stakes” View • First discussed: Sept. 16, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On September 16, 1972, Felt told Woodward that the White House “at the last meeting, regarded the stakes in Watergate as much higher than anyone outside perceived.” (ATPM, p. 72)
Who knew? Dean’s first Watergate meeting with the President and Haldeman was at 5:27 PM on September 15, 1972, the day before Felt told Woodward of the White House meeting. Only the President, Haldeman and Dean knew Watergate was discussed in the meeting. As a result of the meeting, Dean was first sure of the President’s involvement in Watergate. Felt does not identify to Woodward that Dean attended the mentioned White House meeting.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean modified this excerpt using ellipsis to remove the reference to the White House meeting.
3. Use of CIA to Limit FBI Investigation (two excerpts) • First discussed: Sept. 16, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On September 16, 1972, Felt told Woodward in oblique terms about the late-June 1972 White House effort to use the CIA to limit the FBI investigation (ATPM, p. 72) and later on May 16, 1973, provided Woodward further details of this effort (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Dean was among only a handful of people directly involved in this highly-secretive effort before Felt first mentioned this effort to Woodward on September 16, 1972. Despite Dean’s direct involvement in this effort, Felt does not mention Dean’s involvement to Woodward.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean broke Felt’s initial information about this effort into unrecognizable pieces that individually were not traceable.
4. Strachan’s Wiretap Reports • First discussed: Sept. 16, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On September 16, 1972, Felt mentioned “wiretap logs” to Woodward. (ATPM, p. 73)
Who knew? Woodward’s description of the “wiretap logs” in ATPM is less detailed than the description that Woodward first documented in his original newspaper article. Strachan described the “wiretap reports” to Dean on June 19, 1972, in words strikingly similar to those Felt used to describe the reports, as documented in Woodward’s September 20, 1972, news article. Strachan told Dean on June 19, 1972, about his destroying “confidential source memos which could . . . have been wiretap reports with the sources carefully camouflaged. . . . ” Felt told Woodward on September 16, 1972, about “memos describing wiretapped telephone conversations of Democratic Party officials at the Watergate. The memos each began with the phrase ‘Confidential informant says,’ thereby making it possible that those that read them did not necessarily realize the contents had come from wiretapping.” Few besides Strachan and Dean knew of the wiretap reports before Felt provided Woodward nearly the identical description of the wiretap memos that Strachan earlier provided Dean.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean misled others into believing this Felt information about the wiretap memos “was right out of the CRP.” Dean failed to list this excerpt in his analysis.
5. Porter and Magruder Involved • First discussed: Sept. 17, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward:
Who knew? Prior to September 17, 1972, Dean had prepared Magruder to testify and thus knew Porter would commit perjury. Dean was one of only a handful of people that knew Magruder and Porter committed perjury before Felt told Woodward that Magruder and Porter were involved in Watergate.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean removed the details of this Felt information and claimed this Felt information was “widely known.” Dean claimed the Porter portion of this was not true.
6. Sloan Was Not Involved • First discussed: Sept. 17, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On September 17, 1972, Felt advised Woodward that Sloan had no prior knowledge of the bugging and no knowledge of what Liddy did with the money Sloan dispersed to him. (ATPM, p. 133)
Who knew? Sloan met with Dean on multiple occasions following the Watergate arrests since Sloan was concerned with his potential criminal liability. Few besides Dean knew of Sloan’s true involvement in Watergate.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean removed the details of this information and claimed this Felt information was “widely known.”
7. Hunt Contributors List Project • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward of Hunt’s “contributors list” project. (ATPM, p. 131)
Who knew? Hunt kept notebooks that described his various White House projects and operations locked in his office safe. Hunt’s description of this project in his later Watergate book matched the description Felt gave Woodward. Dean gained access to the contents of Hunt’s office safe, including the notebooks, on the evening of June 19, 1972, but Dean denied having seen the notebooks until November 2, 1973, when Dean suddenly admitted to prosecutors that he had destroyed the Hunt notebooks. Few besides Dean knew of this Hunt project. Dean had access to the Hunt notebooks that described the project.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean refuted this Felt information about Hunt’s “contributors list” project but does not mention his own access to and destruction of Hunt’s notebooks. Dean identifies Felt’s information about Hunt’s “contributors’ list” project as “not true” and lists references that failed to identify the project. Dean is technically correct for the limited references he cites that do not mention the project; however, Hunt did describe the project on p. 213 of his 1974 book Undercover.
8. Mitchell’s Investigation (2) • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward of Mitchell’s investigation. (ATPM, p. 132)
Who knew? Dean met with Mardian on Watergate just after Mitchell had assigned Mardian and LaRue to do an investigation to find out the facts about Watergate. Dean on March 21, 1973, advised the President that lawyers at the Re-election Committee did an investigation to find out the facts. Dean was one of the few aware of Mitchell’s investigation.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean discredited Felt’s information about a Mitchell investigation.
9. Hunt Was Ordered to Leave (2) • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Ehrlichman ordered Hunt to leave. (ATPM, p. 132 and p. 161)
Who knew? Liddy and Dean met at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972, at which time Dean advised Liddy to tell Hunt to leave. Dean later claimed that Ehrlichman was the one that told Dean to order Hunt to leave. Liddy, Hunt, and Ehrlichman failed to corroborate Dean’s account that Ehrlichman ordered Hunt to leave. Though Dean either gave or passed Liddy the order for Hunt to leave, Felt fails to tell Woodward of Dean’s direct involvement in passing the order. Only Dean and Felt share the view that Ehrlichman was the one that gave the order.
10. Mardian’s “Could Ruin” View • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Mardian and/or LaRue had said that what Hunt and Liddy had done could ruin the administration. (ATPM, p. 132)
Who knew? On June 19, 1972, Mardian told Dean that what Hunt and Liddy had done “could ruin the President.” Dean later stated that Mitchell had been shocked by a Colson-Hunt operation “that could ruin the Nixon administration” and designated this Felt information as true.
11. Colson Was Getting Reports • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward of Colson’s limited Watergate involvement in receiving reports. (ATPM, p. 133)
Who knew? On June 20, 1972, Haldeman gave the President nearly the identical report to the one Felt gave Woodward on October 9, 1972. Dean at a 10 AM meeting on June 20, 1972, met with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell, and likely told of Colson’s limited Watergate involvement in receiving reports. Dean failed to mention this meeting in his Senate testimony. Haldeman advised the President of Colson’s limited involvement in receiving reports at 4:35 PM that same afternoon in words strikingly similar to the words Felt later used with Woodward.
12. Martha Mitchell Knows Nothing • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Martha Mitchell “knows nothing” about the Watergate break-in but that it didn’t mean she wouldn’t talk. (ATPM, p. 133)
Who knew? Dean attended a meeting at John Mitchell’s apartment on the evening of June 19, 1972, and witnessed the phone interactions with Martha Mitchell that included calls from reporters. Few besides Dean witnessed these phone interactions with Martha Mitchell. Neither Dean nor Felt are not known to have had any direction interaction with Martha Mitchell following the Watergate arrests. In addition, Martha Mitchell was isolated from the public after the Watergate arrests.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his analysis.
13. Caulfield-Ulasewicz Operations • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward some of the details of private investigator Ulasewicz’s “intelligence-gathering and games” without naming either Ulasewicz or Caulfield, Caulfield being a Dean employee who was Ulasewicz’s supervisor. (ATPM, p. 133)
Who knew? During their time together at the White House, Caulfield shared with Dean the scope and details of his and Anthony Ulasewicz’s “intelligence-gathering and games.” Dean was one of the few persons knowledgeable of Caulfield and Ulasewicz’s intelligence-gathering activities.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM, Dean split this Felt information into seemingly-unrelated pieces, making the individual pieces significantly more difficult to understand and trace to Dean.
14. Hunt Manufactured Items for the Press • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward about Hunt’s “manufactured items” for the press. (ATPM, p. 133)
Who knew? Few knew that Hunt fabricated cables in his work at the White House. Dean gained access to Hunt’s fabricated cables from Hunt’s safe on the evening of June 19, 1972. Dean knew the cables were fabricated. Dean and Ehrlichman passed the fabricated cables to Acting FBI Director L. Patrick Gray who did not realize the cables were fabricated. Felt and Dean both knew the items were fabricated while Gray did not. Few other than Dean knew of Hunt’s “fabricated” cables before Felt told Woodward of them.
15. Eagleton’s Health Records (2) • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that the problems with “Eagleton’s drunk-driving record or his health records” somehow involved the White House and Hunt. (ATPM, p. 133) On May 16, 1973, Felt was more specific and stated that Eagleton’s health records had arrived at Ehrlichman’s office before they were leaked to the press. (ATPM, p. 316)
Who knew? Within days of Eagleton being nominated, White House staffers and the press knew of Eagleton’s mental health issues. After Felt admitted being Deep Throat, the FBI was proven not to have had Eagleton’s health records but Dean refuted the finding that to insinuate the FBI was knowledgeable. Other than Dean’s apparently false claim that the FBI, and therefore Felt, had this information, there is no direct proof yet found that Dean had this information prior to Felt giving it to Woodward. However, as White House counsel, Dean likely knew the White House had the records and may have concluded that the White House was responsible for the release.
16. Sally Harmony’s Knowledge • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that Liddy’s secretary, Sally Harmony, committed perjury. (ATPM, p. 134)
Who knew? Dean believed Harmony was involved in Watergate but that she had not admitted everything to investigators. Dean on March 21, 1973, told the President that Harmony knew more than she had admitted. Few if any others besides Dean and Felt believed Harmony had further involvement than she had previously admitted to investigators.
17. Don’t Focus on the Break-in • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward to “concentrate on other activities, not the break-in at the Democratic Headquarters.” (ATPM, p. 134)
Who knew? Felt’s advice to Woodward was not published until the 1974 release of All The President’s Men. Dean gave Chief Counsel Sam Dash nearly the identical advice in their initial secret meeting on May 12, 1973, when Dean told Dash that Dash was “making the mistake of concentrating on the break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters.” No one besides Dean and Felt were directing those investigating Watergate to other activities besides the break-in at the Democratic headquarters.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to include this topic in his analysis.
18. Clawson’s Canuck Letter • Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward the story that White House staffer Ken Clawson wrote the “Canuck Letter.” (ATPM, p. 134)
Who knew? Dean knew the story that White House staffer Ken Clawson wrote the “Canuck Letter” before Felt told it to Woodward. Dean admitted, “I heard the same rumor about the Canuck letter, long before Woodward reported it based on Woodward’s tip.” Dean later designated this information as false. Though it was false, Dean still believed it was true at the time Felt told Woodward it.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean designated Felt’s “Canuck letter” information as false without explanation. Though it was false, Dean and others likely believed it to be true at the time.
19. Segretti’s Fifty Operatives • First discussed: Oct. 9, 1972 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On October 9, 1972, Felt told Woodward that there were 50 White House operatives without mention of either Segretti or Dean. (ATPM, p. 135)
Who knew? After the Watergate arrests, Dean alone met directly with Segretti and reviewed his activities. Besides Segretti, only Dean knew the extent of Segretti’s activities. On May 2, 1973, Dean told prosecutors that, “Segretti had a network of 50 operatives and kept records of all the people and movements.” Even Segretti himself disagreed with both Dean and Felt’s characterization about the size and scope of his operation. Felt did not mention Segretti to Woodward but Dean’s statement to prosecutors added Segretti involvement in the version he told prosecutors.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean claimed this Felt information was “bad information” and “absolutely false.”
20. Hiring of Hunt and Liddy (two excerpts) • First discussed: Jan. 25, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On January 25, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Mitchell and Colson were behind the Watergate operation and were Liddy and Hunt’s “sponsors.” (ATPM, p. 244 and p. 245)
Who knew? Dean was aware of Colson’s involvement with Hunt via the Hunt notebooks. Dean was aware of Colson’s hiring of Hunt via a check of White House personnel records. Dean also knew that Hunt and Liddy visited Colson at his office and that Colson then called Magruder to get him going on the project. Dean was personally involved with Mitchell’s hiring of Liddy and knew that Liddy conceived of the Watergate operation and presented it to Mitchell at meetings at which Dean was present. Few besides Dean knew that Mitchell and Colson were Liddy and Hunt’s sponsors.
21. Defendants “Taken Care of” • First discussed: Jan. 25, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On January 25, 1973, Felt told Woodward that the Watergate defendants believe they are going to be taken care of” and that it was “done convincingly by someone high up.” (ATPM, p. 244)
Who knew? Dean admitted he told Caulfield to pass messages to McCord on January 13, 1973, that “your wife and family will be taken care of.” Caulfield stated that he only disclosed the business of Executive clemency for McCord with Dean at the White House. Dean directly managed Caulfield’s meetings with McCord and Caulfield and provided Dean with status reports after each meeting. Few besides Dean and McCord knew this information before Felt told Woodward.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his analysis.
22. Executive Privilege Strategy • First discussed: Jan. 25, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On January 25, 1973, Felt told Woodward that part of the White House strategy to block investigators would involve a broad claim of Executive privilege. (ATPM, p. 245)
Who knew? Dean was responsible for developing the legal strategy of a broad claim of executive privilege. Dean in the Senate Watergate Hearings, Book 4, p. 1460, mentions, “the discussions of executive privilege to prevent the testimony of people from the White House. . . . ” Dean was directly involved in developing this strategy that Felt later provided Woodward.
23. President on News Leaks • First discussed: Jan. 25, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On January 25, 1973, Felt told Woodward that the President had gone on a rampage about news leaks and other things the President had said. (ATPM, p. 268)
Who knew? Dean was present during the President’s rant about the Washington Post and news leaks on September 15, 1972, as White House tapes confirm.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean fails to correlate his September 15, 1972 meeting with the President to the rant that Felt described to Woodward. Dean failed to include this topic in his analysis.
24. Gray Pressured Nixon for Job (two excerpts) • First discussed: Jan. 25, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: In late-February, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Gray implied he should remain on the job to ensure the investigation remained under control. (ATPM, p. 270)
Who knew? Gray met with Ehrlichman concerning his nomination as FBI Director at 8:45 AM on February 16, 1973. Gray met with Nixon from 9:08 to 9:38 AM on February 16, 1973, and told the President that he should remain in his job as FBI director. This matches Felt’s description to Woodward that Gray told the President, “ . . . all hell could break loose if he wasn’t able to stay in the job permanently and keep the lid on.” The President could easily have perceived Gray’s words as a threat.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean misled others stating, “This never happened. . . . ” Dean designates the entity of the referenced statement as false. Dean also uses Felt’s minor error of mischaracterizing the Gray-Nixon meeting as having occurred in early February, as opposed to February 16, to repudiate Felt’s statement.
25. Some Top People against Gray • First discussed: late Feb. 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: In late February 1973, Felt told Woodward that “some of the top people in the White House were dead set against” Gray’s nomination as permanent FBI director. (ATPM, p. 270)
Who knew? Dean told Ehrlichman that he was against Gray’s nomination as permanent FBI Director because of Gray’s destruction of documents. Ehrlichman indicated to Dean that the destruction was not a problem. Felt did not tell Woodward that the person opposing Gray’s nomination was Dean. Only Dean and Ehrlichman participated in this discussion. Few besides Dean both knew of Gray’s destruction of documents and opposed Gray’s nomination.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean designated Felt’s information that “some of the top people” opposed Gray’s nomination as being false without explanation. It appears Dean alone opposed Gray’s nomination.
26. Mitchell Wiretaps Confirmation (3 excerpts) • First discussed: late Feb. 1973 • Origin: FBI/Dean
Felt told Woodward: Felt told Woodward in late February 1973, that out-of-channel “wiretappers” targeted reporters and officials (ATPM, p. 270) and on May 16, 1973, added that Mitchell “started doing covert national and international things early. . . . ” (ATPM, p. 319)
Who knew? Though Dean knew this information before Felt told Woodward, Felt himself also knew this information from his FBI duties. Therefore, this is the only information traced that likely came from FBI files. Curiously, while a separate leak of this information resulted in Felt’s retirement from the FBI, Felt was not the one that leaked that information. The separate leak originated from a different FBI staffer via a New York Times reporter.
27. Haldeman Pushed Mitchell for Operation • First discussed: late Feb. 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: In late February 1973, Felt told Woodward that Haldeman pushed Mitchell to setup a wiretapping operation for the campaign and to move Hunt and Liddy from the White House to the campaign. (ATPM, p. 270)
Who knew? On March 21, 1973, in his “cancer on the Presidency” talk, Dean told the President that Watergate “started with an instruction to me from Bob Haldeman to see if we couldn’t set up a perfectly legitimate campaign intelligence business over at the Re-election Committee.” Caulfield put together a plan that Dean took to Mitchell. Therefore, the instruction went from Haldeman to Dean to Mitchell. Few others besides Dean would have known of both Haldeman and Mitchell’s involvement in this.
28. Dean and Haldeman Will Resign • First discussed: Apr. 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: Felt told Woodward on April 16, 1973, that Haldeman and Dean would resign. (ATPM, p. 288)
Who knew? This same information about White House resignations arrived in Dean’s possession only hours before, as documented in the transcript of White House tapes for April 16, 1973 (4:07-4:35 PM). Dean asked the President, “How do you want to handle it: Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Dean?” The President responded that, “ . . . the biggest part of the question is when, under the circumstances. . . . ” Dean alone attended the meeting with the President only hours before Felt advised Woodward that Dean and Haldeman are out. Dean’s meeting with the President ended at 4:35 PM. Only Dean and the President were aware of this information and Felt gave Woodward this information only a few hours later.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean quibbles, stating “it would be several weeks before that ‘for sure’ decision would be made.” But Nixon was sure for as Nixon himself said during his meeting with Dean, “…the question is when…” The question was not if.
29. Gray’s Instructions on Files (2) • First discussed: Apr. 26, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On April 26, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Dean and Ehrlichman told Gray that the files should never be made public but that Gray understood he should destroy the files. (ATPM, p. 306)
Who knew? Dean told Petersen about the files and Petersen confronted Gray about the files in December 1972. Gray then telephoned Dean and advised him that he had burned the files. Dean discussed this exact information in nearly the exact same words in his Senate Watergate Hearings testimony. Gray stated that he advised others, and specifically Felt, of his destruction of the files on the morning of April 27, 1973. However, Felt confirmed Gray’s burning of the files to Woodward on April 26, 1973, the day before Gray told Felt. The detailed veracity and timing of Felt’s description to Woodward indicates Felt likely obtained this information via Dean. Felt mentions Dean’s name to Woodward this time whereas Felt previously (#14) did not mention Dean. Gray understood that Dean and Ehrlichman wanted the files destroyed. Dean and Gray denied wanting the files destroyed but said they should never see the light of day (See Note 24). Felt’s version of events matches Dean’s version that Gray was not told to destroy the files.
30. Dean Told to Dump Stuff in River • Apr. 26., 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On April 26, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Ehrlichman told Dean to drop evidence in the river. (ATPM, p. 306)
Who knew? Dean stated that Ehrlichman told Dean in the days after the Watergate arrests to drop evidence into the river. Felt told Woodward on April 26, 1973, that Ehrlichman told Dean to drop evidence into the river. In Dean’s Senate Watergate testimony, p. 938, Dean stated, “I remember well his [Ehrlichman’s] instructions: He told me to shred the documents and ‘deep six’ the briefcase. I asked him what he meant by ‘deep six.’ He leaned back in his chair and said: ‘You drive across the river on your way home at night—don’t you?’ I said, yes. He said, ‘Well, when you cross the bridge on your way home, just toss the briefcase into the river.’” It is implausible that Ehrlichman would have told others of his instructions to destroy evidence, yet Felt knows Ehrlichman’s nearly-exact words to Dean.
31. Gray Burned Files • First discussed: Apr. 26, 1973 • Origin: Gray/Dean
Felt told Woodward: On April 26, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Gray burned files that Ehrlichman and Dean gave him. (ATPM, p. 271)
Who knew? According to Dean’s Senate Watergate testimony, p. 949, Gray told Dean to “‘hang tight’ on not disclosing his receipt of the documents.” Gray also told Dean he “had destroyed the documents.” It is implausible that Gray would have told others of his destruction of the documents, yet Felt somehow knows of it. According to Gray, Gray told Dean that he burned the documents. Felt apparently knew about Dean’s opposition to Gray’s nomination since late February 1973, and therefore since late February 1973 likely also knew about Gray’s destruction of documents (see #25). On April 25, 1973, Gray also told Senator Weicker that he had destroyed the files by putting them in a burn wastebasket under his desk on July 3, 1972. Weicker told others in the press.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his analysis.
32. Secret Service Intelligence on Candidate • First discussed: Apr. 26, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: Felt told Woodward in the week before May 16, 1973, that the Secret Service forwarded information on the private life of a Democratic presidential candidate to the White House. (ATPM, p. 316)
Who knew? Felt does not mention that Dean was the White House recipient of the Secret Service information. However, Dean’s testimony precisely matched the information that Felt told Woodward. Dean in his Senate testimony stated that in the spring of 1972 a Secret Service agent brought him information on Senator McGovern that Dean gave to Colson, who had it published.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this item in his analysis.
33. Haldeman Told FBI to Investigate Schorr • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: In the week prior to May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Haldeman ordered the Schorr investigation. (ATPM, p. 316)
Who knew? Dean testified that Haldeman ordered the FBI to investigate Schorr. Higby passed the order to Hoover. Hoover knew only that Higby ordered the Schorr investigation and passed Higby’s order to Felt. Neither Hoover nor Felt directly knew that Haldeman ultimately ordered the Schorr investigation. Felt does not admit that Haldeman personally ordered the investigation in his later book. Only Haldeman, Higby, and Dean knew that Haldeman personally ordered the FBI to investigate Schorr before Felt told Woodward this.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his analysis.
34. Dual Warning—Bugging and Danger (two excerpts) • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: Felt warned Woodward on May 16, 1973 that his life may be in danger and of electronic surveillance. (ATPM, p. 317)
Who knew? On April 20, 1973, Dean’s lawyer and Dean’s deputy Fielding separately advised Dean with separate and distinct warnings (the first on Dean’s life being in danger and the second on Dean being the target of electronic bugging). Less than one month later during their May 16, 1973, meeting, Felt gave Woodward these same two warnings. Two separate and distinct warnings to Dean (one on his life being in danger and the next one on bugging) made on the same day to Dean from two separate individuals are combined into Felt’s single warning to Woodward less than one month later.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean described Felt’s dual warnings to Woodward as “incorrect” and stated that Felt “falsely” told Woodward of these two warnings.
35. Senator Baker Meetings/Cooperation • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Dean • False
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that, “Baker is in the bag completely, reporting directly back to the White House” and that “Dean talked with Senator Baker.” (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Dean helped plan the secret meeting between Baker and the President and wrote the meeting’s agenda. Haldeman told Dean to avoid normal White House channels with meeting documents. Dean’s name was on a Dean-drafted agenda as an attendee, though Dean was never summoned. Dean said Haldeman told him that the Senator “appeared to be very interested in being cooperative with the President and the President had the impression that he might be helpful.” Dean told Dash that the President believed that Baker would work for him inside the committee and that the President interpreted Baker’s overture to the White House as an indication that Baker wanted to help the President. While Woodward reported that Felt told him that “Dean talked with Senator Baker,” Woodward told Sam Dash that his confidential source said that, “Baker had privately met with President Nixon.” It appears Woodward erred in stating “Dean talked with Senator Baker.”
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean denied the validity of this Felt information based on the fact that he did not talk with Baker but Dean fails to address how Felt knew of Baker’s interactions with the White House. Dean narrowly denies Felt’s claim to Woodward, stating, “I never had a meeting with Baker. . . . ” Though true, Dean fails to detail his involvement with the President’s secret meeting with Baker. Dean transforms Felt’s information from “talked with Senator Baker” to “met with Sen. Howard Baker” and disparages Felt’s information without explanation, before falsely concluding that “it is virtually impossible to trace the source” of this Felt information. Dean later wrote, “This is absolutely false. I never spoke with Baker. And Baker certainly was not in the bag.”
36. President to Dean on National Security • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: Felt told Woodward on May 16, 1973, that the President told Dean not to talk about national security matters. Felt said that the President “threatened Dean personally and said if he ever revealed the national security activities that President would insure he went to jail.” (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? The President told Dean on April 15, 1973, not discuss national security activities with prosecutors. This Dean meeting with the President was not tape recorded since the recorder ran out of tape. Dean later termed the President’s warning an “admonition.” No one but Dean and the President attended this meeting. As documented in Case #44, Felt also described from this meeting the President’s depressed appearance. While Dean keys on the manner Felt says the President delivered the instruction to Dean, in reality, the manner the President gave Dean the instruction doesn’t matter. All that matters is that Felt was aware that the President told Dean not to discuss national security matters with the prosecutors. This Felt information could only have arisen from either the President or Dean.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean termed this Felt information “incorrect” and “wrong,” and stated “this never happened, a fact that can be corroborated by Nixon’s tapes.” Dean knew that a corroborating Nixon tape didn’t exist. It didn’t exist on tape because the recorder was out of tape.
37. Caulfield Offers Clemency • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that Caulfield met McCord and said that the President “knows that we are meeting and he offers you executive clemency and you’ll only have to spend about 11 months in jail.” (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Caulfield passed messages between Dean and McCord concerning Executive clemency. Caulfield told McCord that the President knew they were meeting. At Dean’s instruction, Caulfield offered McCord Executive clemency. On March 21, Dean tells the President about the discussions with McCord that he learned about via Caulfield.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean devalued this Felt information and claimed it was useless in tracing Deep Throat. Dean failed to list this topic in his own analysis.
38. Caulfield Threatened McCord • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Dean • False
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward of Caulfield’s aggressive interactions with McCord and stated that “Caulfield threatened McCord and said, ‘Your life is no good in this country if you don’t cooperate. . . . ’” (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Caulfield testified that he only discussed with Dean the business of Executive clemency for McCord. Dean directly managed Caulfield’s meetings with McCord and Caulfield provided Dean with status reports after each meeting. Caulfield gives what he terms “friendly advice” to McCord that McCord interprets to be a “personal threat.” Caulfield denies that he ever pressured or threatened McCord.
Dean’s muddling: Dean eliminates “Caulfield threatened McCord” to reduce this information to, “Your life is no good in this country if you don’t cooperate” and then declares that, “This never happened, although apparently some investigators believed this true.” Removing Caulfield’s name removes Caulfield’s tie to Dean. Though Dean does not identify “some investigators,” it is likely Dean meant McCord himself – a Dean misdirection. McCord testified that he took McCord’s words as a “personal threat.”Dean lists this information among other “incorrect statements,” declares “much of this information is wrong,” and reduces two pieces of Felt information into one. Dean designates this entire excerpt as being false without further explanation.
39. President’s Been Blackmailed • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that the President was being blackmailed. (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Dean told Nixon on March 21, 1973, “we’re being blackmailed.” Later in the meeting, Dean added that, “the blackmail is continuing.” Only Dean and the President were in the room at the time of Dean’s “blackmail” comment.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean lists this Felt information among other items the he identifies as “correct, or reasonably close.” Dean weakens this Felt information by adding the confusing parenthetical “(Throat claimed the President himself, which was only indirectly true).” While Dean’s added parenthetical is possibly true, is does not diminish the fact that Felt knew the President was being blackmailed or that Dean was the one that advised the President of the blackmail only a month earlier.
40. Dean’s Estimate of $1 Million • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that the cover-up cost to be about $1 million. (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Dean met with the President in a taped meeting beginning at 10:12 AM on March 21, 1973. When the President asked how much money Dean needed for the cover-up, Dean advised it would cost 1 million dollars over the next two years. Besides the President and Haldeman, this Felt information could only have originated from Dean.
Dean’s muddling: After the 1974 publication of ATPM, Dean diminished the importance of this Felt information by avoiding the “$1 million” figure, rewriting the information, and focusing on other aspects of Felt’s information. Dean lists this information among Felt’s “other erroneous and misleading information” from May 16, and rewrites Felt’s information to change the tense with Felts stating the cover-up “had cost $1 million.”
41. Dean as a Go-Between • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that “Dean acted as a go-between between Haldeman-Ehrlichman and Mitchell-LaRue.”. (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Dean testified that from the first days of his involvement in the Watergate cover-up, he was “carrying messages from Mitchell, Stans, and Mardian to Haldeman and Ehrlichman—and vice versa…” Dean later restated this role saying he “carried messages back and forth between the Mitchell faction and the White House faction.” In either version, Dean describes his role in words remarkably similar to those of Felt. Haldeman and Ehrlichman were at the White House while LaRue worked for Mitchell at the Committee to Re-Elect the President.
Dean’s muddling: Dean’s lists this along with other information he categorized as “correct, or reasonably close.” Dean slightly transforms Felt’s information, changing its meaning in the process. Dean seemingly becomes a messenger between Haldeman and Ehrlichman, and a messenger between Mitchell and LaRue.
42. Dean’s Detailed Documents • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt described Dean’s documents to Woodward as “much more than anyone has imagined and they are quite detailed.” (ATPM, p. 318)
Who knew? Prior to his departure from the White House, Dean secretly took with him a large cache of documents from White House files. Few if any knew Dean took the documents, let alone had access to Dean’s documents prior to his Senate testimony on June 25, 1973, when Dean provided 80 documents as exhibits to his testimony. Dean fully controlled access to these documents prior to his Senate testimony. While it is unknown whether Felt had direct access to Dean’s documents, Felt’s description of Dean’s documents as “much more than anyone has imagined” and “quite detailed” accurately describes the documents and suggests Felt viewed Dean’s documents.
Dean’s muddling: After the publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean abbreviated this Felt information and avoided analysis of it. Dean guides readers towards believing that Deep Throat is talking about the Huston Plan with an added parenthetical. Dean lists this Felt information along with other information he describes as “ . . . correct, or reasonably close . . . ” but provides no analysis as to who had access to his documents prior to Felt’s telling Woodward of the documents.
43. Liddy’s Offer to be Shot • May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that “Liddy told Dean that they could shoot him and/or that he would shoot himself, but that he would never talk and always be a good soldier.” (ATPM, p. 319)
Who knew? According to Dean, Liddy told Dean at 11:15 AM on June 19, 1972, that “he was a soldier and would never talk” and that “if anyone wished to shoot him on the street, he was ready.” Only Dean and Liddy attended this meeting. Dean told prosecutors that, “Liddy also said he was a good soldier and volunteered to go to any street corner to be shot.” The FBI did not have this information at the time Felt gave the information to Woodward. Felt did not give the information to the FBI.
Dean’s muddling: Dean failed to list this topic in his own analysis.
44. The President’s Depression • First discussed: May 16, 1973 • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: On May 16, 1973, Felt told Woodward that the President has had “fits of “dangerous’ depression.” (ATPM, p. 319)
Who knew? Dean met with the President at 9:15 PM on April 15, 1973, and during his Senate testimony described the President’s appearance at the meeting in terms that were indicative of the symptoms of depression—liquor on breath, exhausted appearance, unkempt clothes, etc. Dean later pointed out that “this was not the well-manicured Richard Nixon I was used to.” Though Dean doesn’t use the term “depression” to describe Nixon, Dean’s implication is clear—Nixon was depressed. Both this case (#44) and case #36 involve information from Dean’s same meeting with the President on April 15, 1973. Only Dean and the President were present in the meeting. It is unlikely that Nixon described himself to Felt or others as depressed. There is no evidence that Felt met with the President during the period of Watergate. Within a month of Dean’s meeting with the President, Felt told Woodward the President was depressed.
45. Deliberate Erasures (two excerpts) • First discussed: Nov. 4, 1973 • Origin: Fielding/Dean
Felt told Woodward: On or about November 4, 1973, Felt told Woodward that there were “deliberate erasures” on the tape. (ATPM, p. 333)
Who knew? Prior to this date, only the President, his secretary Rose Mary Woods, some of the lawyers, and Haig were the only ones aware that Woods had, according to her, “accidentally” erased 4½ to 5 minutes of the tape. The tapes were kept locked in Woods’s office since the “accident.” On the evening of November 1, 1973, White House lawyer Buzhardt got access to the tapes and had another White House lawyer review the tapes. The next day, Buzhardt and Garment began acting as though they were aware that there was a longer-than-expected erasure on the tapes. That same day, Dean without prompting suddenly admitted to his destruction of Hunts notebooks. Dean’s admission served to remove one White House lawyer from any involvement with the notebooks. Though speculative, White House tapes prove that the Hunt notebooks were likely discussed during the extended erasure.
Dean’s muddling: After publication of ATPM in 1974, Dean suggested that the President made the erasures himself.
46. Liddy’s Burned Hand • Undated (movie) • Origin: Dean
Felt told Woodward: Felt told Woodward the story of Liddy intentionally burning his own hand. Felt told Woodward, “I was at a party once and Liddy put his hand over a candle and he kept it there . . . he kept it right in the flame until his flesh was burned. Somebody said, ‘What’s the trick?’ and Liddy said, ‘The trick is not minding.’” This is undated information is from the ATPM movie and does not appear in the ATPM book. (1975 ATPM movie)
Who knew? According to Dean, Liddy told Dean the story of his intentionally burnt hand in January of 1972. Dean said that Liddy told him that he intentionally burned his hand with a candle to demonstrate his will power. As related in the 1975 movie, Felt apparently told Woodward the same version of the story that Dean recalled Liddy telling him. While Liddy himself said his hand was burned with a lighter, both Dean and Felt’s version of the Liddy story coincide in the detail that Liddy was burned with a candle, not a lighter. Liddy told Magruder he burned his hand with a blowtorch. It is unknown as to why this story appears in the movie but not in Woodward’s book. Liddy did not tell everyone the true story of his intentionally burning his own hand. Liddy told most others a cover story that a pack of matches had gone off in his hand. Liddy told Dean the version of the story that he did not share with others “back at the committee.” This illustrates yet another piece of Felt’s information that was known to Dean and very few others before Felt relayed the information to Woodward.
Dean’s muddling: Dean explains that he has ignored all clues from the movie unless they were included in the book. Therefore, since the book does not mention Felt telling the story of Liddy’s burnt hand, Dean does not address it.
Copyright © 2011 by Philip T. Mellinger. All rights reserved.
